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I. INTRODUCTION
The objectives of sales laws, broadly speaking, should be to
facilitate the contribution which private bargains can make to
achieving desired social goals, such as economic efficiency, and to
prevent bargains from yielding unacceptable outcomes, such as the
exploitation of weak parties. These objectives cannot be realized,
however, without an understanding of the contribution which bar-
gains can make toward achieving particular social goals, the requi-
site conditions for bargaining effectiveness, and the situations in
which exploitation is possible. The unfortunate regulatory choices
often made by the Uniform Commercial Code (the Code) are gener-
ally explicable as resting on misapprehensions as to one or more of
these matters.
I have elsewhere sought to document these misapprehensions in
three areas. Initially, I argued that the two goals of optimizing the
* Professor of Law, Indiana University; B.S. Bates College, 1961; LL.B., Vale Law
School, 1964. My colleagues Joseph Brodley, Julius Getman and Jon Hirschoff made quite
helpful comments on prior drafts. Any errors which remain are mine.
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costs which defective products yield and preventing parties from
bearing concentrated losses when defects occur can best be achieved
through bargains, but only if the parties thereto are sufficiently
informed. I concluded, therefore, that the state should either fill
information gaps where they exist or structure the transactions of
uninformed parties.' The Code, misunderstanding this, neither pro-
vides information nor structures bargains. 2 I have also argued that
consumer buyers cannot bargain rationally with respect to clauses
requiring them to waive defenses against third party financers of
sales, nor can they rationally contract out of the holder in due course
rule, because the information to price the risks which the inability
to assert defenses against financers imposes on such buyers is lack-
ing and cannot be made available except at prohibitive cost. Waiver
of defense clauses should thus be prohibited and the holder in due
course rule, as applied to consumer sales, should be re-
pealed. 3 The Code fails to do either. 4 Finally, I have argued that the
problems posed by unequal bargaining power between sellers and
buyers, except as such inequality arises from differential access to
information, are not susceptible to sensible solution by the judicial
process. 5 The Code, in part because it rests on erroneous assump-
tions as to how economic power shapes bargains, delegates much of
the task of regulating that power to the courts. 6
This article further documents the allegation that the Code's
regulation of sales transactions frequently rests on misapprehensions
regarding the manner in which bargains operate, and thus fails to
maximize the contribution of bargains to social welfare. Its subject
will be the law regulating the parties' rights when sellers deliver
non-conforming goods.
Sales law has long contained a "perfect tender rule," enabling
buyers to reject goods for any non-conformity.' This rule has been
1 Schwartz, The Private Law Treatment of Defective Products in Sales Situations, 49
Ind. L.J. 8 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz].
I See Uniform Commercial Code §§ 2-313 to -16, 2-719.
Schwartz, Optimality and the Cutoff of Defenses Against Financers of Consumer Sales,
15 B.C. Ind. & Com, L. Rev. 499 (1974).
See Uniform Commercial Code §§ 3-302, 3-305, 9-206.
5 Schwartz, Seller Unequal Bargaining Power and the Judicial Process, 49 Ind. L.J. 367
(1974). 	-
6 See Uniform Commercial Code §§ 2-302, 2-719(3). Comment 1 to § 2-302 states its
objectives as preventing "oppression and unfair surprise . . . and not . . disturbance of
allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power." The statute itself, however, creates
no such limitation, nor have the courts. E.g., Sarfati v. M.A. Hittner & Sons, Inc., 135 App.
Div. 2d 1004, 318 N.Y.S.2d 352 (1970); Educational Beneficial, Inc. v. Reynolds, 324
N.Y.S.2d 813 (Civ. Ct. 1971).
7 Professor Gilmore argues that the rule developed in the late nineteenth century. G.
Gilmore, The Death Of Contract 79-80 (1974). It was found in Uniform Sales Act §§ 44, 69.
The Code's version is § 2-601, which provides:
Subject to the provisions of this Article on breach in installment contracts
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almost unanimously, and erroneously, condemned, for two reasons:
first, rejection for slight, easily repairable non-conformities allegedly
produces economic waste, in that it imposes larger costs on sellers
than such non-conformities impose on buyers; and second, buyers
may ostensibly reject for slight non-conformities when in fact they
are rejecting because the deal seems less profitable than it did at the
time the goods were ordered. Such bad faith could defeat a seller's
reasonable expectations as to the grounds on which the deal may be
upsets
The Code's draftsmen responded to these criticisms in two
significant ways. Initially, section 2-508 authorizes sellers to "cure"
non-conforming tenders by repair or replacement. 9 I will show
in this article, however, that if buyers act in good faith, rejecting
only because of the non-conformities themselves, a cure rule is
unnecessary to avoid economic waste since the parties will optimize
breach costs through bargains. The Code, moreover, is not only
unnecessary, but harmful, for it can be used to impose certain
breach costs on buyers unjustifiably and to produce economic waste.
Thus, a cure rule is defensible only because it may minimize buyer
bad faith.
In this regard, two situations must be distinguished. The first
concerns the sale of goods—such as television sets, cars and
(Section 2 -612) and unless otherwise agreed under the sections on contractual limita-
tions of remedy (Sections 2-718 and 2-719), if the goods or the tender of delivery fail
in any respect to conform to the contract, the buyer may
(a) reject the whole; or
(b) accept the whole; or
(c) accept any commercial unit or units and reject the rest.
The perfect tender rule probably often comports with the parties' expectations; buyers gener-
ally expect not to take non-conforming goods and sellers generally expect rejection. Agreement
and custom frequently alter these expectations. See text at notes 42-54 infra.
8 E.g., Honnold, Buyer's Right of Rejection, 97 U. Pa. L. Rev. 457, 470, 475 (1949).
9 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-508, which provides:
(1) Where any tender or delivery by the seller is rejected because non-
conforming and the time for performance has not yet expired, the seller may
seasonably notify the buyer of his intention to cure and may then within the contract
time make a conforming delivery.
(2) Where the buyer rejects a non-conforming tender which the seller had
reasonable grounds to believe would be acceptable with or without money allowance
the seller may if he seasonably notifies the buyer have a further reasonable time to
substitute a conforming tender.
For thoughtful comment on § 2-508, see J. White & R. Summers, Handbook of the Law
Under the Uniform Commercial Code § 8-4, at 266-70 (1972) thereinafter cited as White &
Summers]; Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to the Sale of Goods Under the
Uniform Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 Yale L.J. 199, 209-16 (1963);
Note, 53 Iowa L. Rev. 780 (1967); Note, 69 Mich. L. Rev. 130 (1970); Note, 6 Rutgers Cam.
L.J. 387 (1974). An effective cure, it has been suggested, may also be made by appropriately
reducing the price to compensate for the non-conformity. See Graulich Caterer, Inc. v. Hans
Holterhosch, Inc., 101 N.J. Super. 61, 243 A.2d 253 (1968); White & Summers, supra,
§ 8-4, at 269. However, no court has explicitly so held.
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lathes—the market value of which is stable in the short run. The
ultimate purchasers of these goods use them for considerable
periods. In this situation—the "use case"—buyer bad faith seldom
exists, primarily because the gains to a buyer from so acting will
seldom outweigh his costs. Therefore, no Code provision is needed
to deal with this virtually non-existent problem.
The second situation concerns the sale of goods—such as com-
modities and raw materials—which experience substantial short run
price fluctuations. Buyers of such goods will often have an incentive
to reject in bad faith because the costs of acceptance can be substan-
tial when prices decline. However, the parties in this situation—the
"market fluctuation case"—are generally professionals to whom the
risk of short run price changes is obvious. The parties thus eliminate
this risk by contract.
Bad faith rejections attributable to a decline in market price
seem to occur primarily during periods of unanticipated radical
price fluctuations, produced by significant events such as war, peace
or depression, which suddenly transform use goods into market
fluctuation goods. Requiring buyers to accept cure in such cases is
unwise because cure is not necessarily the best solution to the
problems posed by unanticipated events. Rather, a rule is needed
which will provide courts with sufficient flexibility to do justice
under the circumstances. A better understanding of the manner in
which bargains operate, in sum, will lead to more sensible solutions
to the rejection problem than those reached under section 2-508 of
the Code.
The second important Code response to the supposed evils of a
rule allowing buyers to avoid a transaction for any quality defects is
the substantial impairment limitation on the right to revoke accep-
tance. Section 2-608 of the Code authorizes a buyer who has ac-.
cepted apparently conforming goods to "revoke his acceptance"
thereof if defects later appear, but only.if the non-conformity "sub-
stantially.impairs [the goods'] value to him." 1 ° This limitation is
intended to preclude waste producing and bad faith revocations,
1 ° Uniform Commercial Code § 2-608, which provides:
(1) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose non-
conformity substantially impair's its value to him if he has accepted it
(a) on the reasonable assumption that its non-conformity would be cured and it
has not been seasonably cured; or
(b) without discovery of such non-conformity if his acceptance was reasonably
induced either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller's
assurances.
(2) Revocation of acceptance must occur within a reasonable time after the buyer
discovers or should have discovered the ground for it and before any substantial
change in condition of the goods which is not caused by their own defects. It is not
effective until the buyer notifies the seller of it.
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which supposedly occur when defects are trivial. The revocation of
acceptance section, as the cases under it indicate, is relevant primar-
ily to use goods." However, in that context the substantial impair-
ment limitation is unnecessary to avoid economic waste, often re-
quires the imposition of breach costs on buyers, and sometimes
produces the inefficiencies it attempts to avoid. Moreover, bad faith
revocations apparently occur less frequently in use goods markets
than do bad faith rejections. Therefore, the substantial impairment
limitation should also be repealed.
If these sections were repealed, and buyers were able to avoid
transactions for any quality defects, sellers will probably attempt to
limit contractually the ability of buyers to so escape, as, for exam-
ple, by requiring buyers to accept cure. Even under the Code sellers
frequently preclude revocation by use of repair and replacement
clauses. Such contractual avoidance of the perfect tender rule raises
the problem, noted above, of the conditions under which bargains
can effectively achieve social goals, in this case the goal of optimiz-
ing the risk, rather than the post-tender costs, of breach. In this
regard, certain contractual methods of avoiding the perfect tender
rule should always be permitted, but others should be prohibited or
appropriately restricted.
II. CURE: THE PREVENTION OF ECONOMIC WASTE
A. Theory
Under the perfect tender rule, a non-conforming delivery pre-
sents the seller with four choices: (1) to compensate the buyer for the
goods' decrease in value if the buyer retains them; (2) to repair the
goods; (3) to replace the goods should the buyer find them unaccept-
able in their delivered state, compensating the buyer for any breach
costs remaining after either (2) or (3) is done; and (4) to let the deal
go. Economic waste will be avoided if the least expensive alterna-
tive is selected. The seller is obviously motivated to choose it and
the buyer is unable to force other choices, for his power is limited to
rejection. If, for example, the least expensive alternative for a seller
is to make no deal, but the buyer prefers the more expensive
alternative of repair with a large price discount, the buyer cannot
compel his own choice. However, should the buye'r prefer repair to
(3) A buyer who so revokes has the same rights and duties with regard to the goods
involved as if he had rejected them.
For useful comment, see White & Summers, supra note 9, § 8-3, at 253-66.
11 See, e.g., Rozmus v. Thompson's Lincoln-Mercury Co., 209 Pa. Super. 120, 224 A.2d
782 (1966); Campbell v. Pollack, 101 R.I. 223, 221 A.2d 615 (1966). For a possible exception,
see Birkner v. Purdon, 27 Mich. App. 476, 183 N.W,2d 598 (1970) (Christmas trees).
547
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERICAL LAW REVIEW
no deal, because "repaired goods" impose no out-of-pocket costs on
him, he will forego the discount, which may make repair the least
expensive alternative for the seller; if so, it will be chosen. In this
manner, bargains optimize breach costs. 12
A rigorous demonstration of this perhaps self-evident point,
and of a cure rule's disutility, requires a detailed analysis of the
several costs which breach causes, and an explanation, presented
through a complex set of models, of the way in which bargaining
optimizes these costs. Working through the analysis should yield a
richer understanding of the subject."
The primary model is the sale of a new gas range to a con-
sumer. Upon installation, a minor defect causes the range to leak
gas; as a result, the flow to burners is uncontrollable, making the
appliance useless and hazardous. The buyer rejects. The market is
stable in that the buyer can purchase the same range or a substan-
tially similar one from another seller at approximately the same
price.
This transaction yields four relevant cost categories. First, the
seller may incur the cost of a lost sale, P. 14 Second, the seller may
incur the cost of replacing the range, which at least equals the costs
of delivery and reinstallation, and will exceed them if the seller
cannot recover the full cost to him of the "returned" item. Let this
cost be R. Third, the seller may incur the cost of fixing the range, F.
Finally, the buyer incurs the costs of breach, C.
Buyer cost is, in fact, the sum of several components, the value
12
 This article does not consider cases in which defects cause consequential damages. See
Uniform Commercial Code § 2-715(2). Losses of this magnitude produce problems which
neither § 2-508 nor § 2-608 was meant to resolve.
13 Readers who find the conclusions obvious need only skim section ILA to familiarize
themselves with the cost categories and terminology since later sections use both. Those
readers who decide to skim section U.A should take note of the glossary of symbols used in
this article, provided in note 15 infra.
14
 The complex components of the cost of a lost sale to a retail seller need only be briefly
sketched. Let the seller repair the range and resell it as new. It is commonly thought that the
seller has lost one profit, because he could have made two sales, to the rejecting buyer and to
the subsequent purchaser had the first buyer accepted the goods. E.g., Neri v. Retail Marine
Corp., 30 N.Y.2d 393, 285 N.E.2d 3M, 334 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1972). This, however, has been
shown to be erroneous when the seller is in a competitive market, because in that situation
sellers will expand output only until marginal revenue equals marginal cost: that is, if the
maximizing point is 1,000 units, the seller will resell the rejected unit, but if there had been no
rejection, he would not have made 1,001 sales for that would be inefficient. Thus, the cost of
rejection is the expense of selling the same item twice; it does not include the profit of the first
sale. See Comment, A Theoretical Postscript-Microeconomics and the Lost-Volume Seller, 24
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 712 (1973). If we assume that the seller described in the text is in a
competitive market (the analysis differs unimportantly for our purposes if he is not), his cost
of a lost sale is thus repair of the range and the additional selling expense. Should the defects
cause him to sell the repaired range as used, his cost is thus increased by the diminution in
profit. If, however, the seller may return the unrepaired range to the manufacturer, his breach
cost is handling and the expense of the first sale.
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of which will vary with circumstances. First, assume the seller de-
cides, after rejection, to make no deal. The buyer must then shop
for another range, incurring the cost of a second search, C s . Second,
assume the seller attempts to repair the range. If the range is
imperfectly repaired but the buyer nevertheless accepts, the buyer's
cost is the diminution in intrinsic worth, because the machine per-
forms less satisfactorily, plus the cost (if any) of nonuse during the
repair period. Let this diminution cost be C 1 . Third, if repair is
successful with no "nonuse" cost to the buyer, costs nevertheless
remain. A buyer who saw the range in a store with the nonconform-
ities it exhibited on delivery would not pay the "new range price,"
despite the seller's promise to repair, since the existence of defects
increases, in a concrete manner, the possibility of additional defects,
thereby increasing the purchase risk. Moreover, repair means the
item is no longer "new." The buyer would be purchasing a "fixed
good," which is much like purchasing a used good, and the market
will discount the price. Thus, there is a cost even when repair is
successful, the "market discount" or "fixed good cost," which will be
represented as C2. Fourth, some buyers may demand a "premium"
in addition to the market discount (C 2 ). For example, assume a used
range cost $300, the new one $350, but the "fixed" range would be
valued at $300. Repair thus shifts a buyer who is in the new goods
market—a buyer who has already refused to buy a used $300
range—into the used goods market; and the buyer may want a
"premium" for being moved; concretely, he may want more than the
$50 difference in market value (C2 ) to accept a "fixed" appliance.
This premium, which we will call C3, is as much a cost of breach to
the buyer as any other cost. Finally, if the seller replaces the range,
the buyer incurs no search (C 5 ), repair (C 1 ), market discount (C2), or
premium costs (C 3 ). However, a particular buyer may be more
conscious of the possibility of nonconformity after the seller has once
failed; the brand may be diminished in his eyes, and the buyer may
want a discount to accept replacement. Let this cost be C r .'s
15 The buyer cost categories sometimes overlap. For example, a nonfunctional defect
causing a diminution in intrinsic worth, as when the range can be repaired but its looks
blemished, can also be regarded as a premium discount cost. The categories are kept distinct
in the text to facilitate analysis. The author is indebted to Professor Honnold for the insight,
recorded in the teaching manual of his Commercial Law casebook, that a buyer who saw a
defective product in a store would not pay the full price on the assurance of its perfect repair;
but the author draws different conclusions from the point than does Professor Honnold. See
generally J. Honnold, Cases And Materials on the Law of Sales And Sales Financing (3d ed.
1968).
Readers may find helpful a glossary of the symbols used herein.
P = Cost to seller of a lost sale.
R = Cost to seller of replacing a defective item.
F = Cost to seller of repairing a defective item.
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Numerical values shall be arbitrarily attached to these costs to
illustrate how bargaining optimizes them (any values will do but the
following seem simple).
1. The range costs $350 new. P = $100; R = $90; F = $50. On
delivery, we have assumed, the appliance is useless. The seller will
initially offer to repair the range. Assuming that repair is successful
without cost to the buyer, C 1 equals zero. Assume that C2 = $20; C3
= $10; C r
 = $2. If the range is repaired, the buyer thus incurs a cost
of $30, the market discount for a "fixed" range (C 2
 = $20), plus the
premium for being forced to eschew a "new" item (C 3 = $10).
However, if the buyer accepts repair, he saves the cost of searching
for a second range (C3 ). Let C3
 be $5. With section 2-508 repealed,
the buyer will accept repair plus a price discount of at least $25.
a(This value is the sum ) of C 1 + C2 + C3 — C3 ; that is, 0 + $20 +
$10 — $5 = $25). The seller's total cost, F + EC, will then be
between $75 and $80, inclusive, depending on the seller's astuteness
in compelling the buyer to accept the minimum price discount. Since
this cost is less than the cost of the other alternatives, a lost sale (P)
or replacement (R), the seller will repair and offer a price discount.
Breach cost will then be $75 to $80, the least expensive alternative,
and bargaining prevents economic waste.
2. Assume that all costs remain constant except the cost of
repair (F), which is now $70. The seller will not repair, for the
minimum cost of repair will be $95 (F + >.0 = $70 + 0 + $20 +
$10 — $5(?)). Replacement, however, will cost $92 (R + C r) and a
lost sale will cost $100 (P). Thus, the seller will supply a new range,
charging the buyer $348 (price less C r , the discount to accept re-
placement). Breach cost is now $92, but again the least expensive
alternative is chosen.
3. Assume that these costs are unchanged, except that the
seller's cost of a lost sale (P) is now $65. Since replacement costs $92
and repair costs between $75 and $80 the least expensive alternative
is P and no sale will be made. Breach cost is now $70 (P +
because the buyer made one futile search, but again the parties
optimized breach costs.
Cs
 = Cost to buyer of searching for a second item if the seller let.s the initial rejection
stand.
C, = Cost to buyer of a repaired item's diminution in intrinsic worth (if any) and the
nonuse cost while the item is being repaired (if any).
C s
 = Market discount cost of a "fixed" product.
C3 = Premium cost to a buyer of purchasing "fixed" goods.
Cr
 = Premium cost to a buyer of purchasing a replacement from the originally defaulting
seller.
p = Probability that an item will be defective.
N = The monetary value of the risk of a defective product.
= The sum, as the sum of all buyer costs is X C.
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4. Assume that these costs are unchanged, except that the
defects upon delivery are quite minor, making C 1 = $5; C2 = $10;
C3 = $5. This case may be the one which the critics of the perfect
tender rule had in mind, for rejection apparently impoges a cost of
at least $90 (R) on the seller, while the buyer's costs of acceptance
(IC) are $20. However, if the buyer may reject, the seller will offer
to reduce the price by $20. The buyer should accept this offer and
thus the cost to the seller of the buyer's initial rejection will be $20,
not $90; and the perfect tender rule is plainly desirable, for no
reason justifies imposing this $20 cost on the buyer rather than the
seller. 16
In reality, bargains are seldom conducted with such precision,
for it may be impossible or unprofitable to accurately predict the
cost of alternatives, people sometimes make mistakes, and indiffer-
ence can exist. But bargaining should optimize costs in this situation
as well as, if not better than, in many other areas where the law
does not restrict bargaining. The temptation to ignore a risk when
making a sale, because it is somehow "hypothetical," is absent in
this situation, for something has gone wrong; the parties here deal
not in risks but in problems. Moreover, the chief impediment to
achieving optimality through bargains, the parties' ignorance, is
largely absent. Buyers, for example, who are left to bargain over
allocating the risk of non-conformity must know, inter alia, the
likelihood of defects and their cost. Many buyers may not know
these things. 17
 However, buyers can approximately value their own
search costs, the market value of a used item, and the premium they
will charge for accepting repair or replacement. In addition, sellers
will often be able to approximate the cost of the alternatives they
face. Thus, bargains should optimize breach costs with reasonable
prec ision.
B. The Code' 8
To perceive the effect of the Code, recall illustration one.
Assume that: (1) after repair C 1 = 0 (if intrinsic worth were di-
16 The endpoint of these bargaining games is not necessarily determined exclusively by
the sum of the buyer's breach costs and the seller's cost of repair, replacement or lost profit,
because the buyer may demand a discount larger than his breach costs, which the seller may
pay. The preceding text assumes that buyers will not so act because such assumption
facilitates analysis and appears to correspond with reality. For discussion of this point and the
problems resulting from possible buyer demands for "extra" compensation, see text at notes
32-33 infra. The textual hypotheticals involve the use case; the same factors operate respecting
market fluctuation goods, except that the effect of possible price changes must also be
considered. The problems they pose are discussed in Part II-B, at XXX infra.
17 Sec Schwartz, supra note 1, at 8, 12-18, 19-28.
16 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-508(1) creates an absolute right to cure if the seller
seasonably notifies the buyer of his intention to cure and if he can do so "within the contract'
551
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERICAL LAW REVIEW
minished the buyer could probably reject since section 2-508 ulti-
mately requires "a conforming delivery"); and (2) the Code permits
cure by repair alone, thus the seller need offer no price discount
reflecting C2 or C3. The seller will, of course, repair since the cost of
repair (F) is $50. While breach costs are $80, approximately the
result yielded by bargaining alone, the seller bears only $50 of them
(F), while the buyer bears $30 (C2 + C3). This result is unsatisfac-
tory for, while no economic waste exists, breach costs are imposed
on the buyer for no apparent reason. 19
Returning to illustration two, where all costs were the same as
in illustration one except that repair cost (F) was $70, the seller will
again repair, for F is less expensive than R or P. This -result is
unsatisfactory for two reasons: first, the buyer again bears $30 of
breach costs, and second, the total breach cost (F + /C) is now
$100. Bargaining, however, would have induced the seller to re-
place at a total breach cost of $92 (R + C r). In this situation the
Code not only imposes breach costs on the buyer unjustifiably, but
also requires more economic resources to be committed to a breach
than is necessary.
Thus, if the Code is read to permit sellers to cure without
discounting the price to reflect market discount and premium costs,
its effect is to shift those costs to buyers and, possibly, to produce
economic waste. The statute, moreover, invites that construction.
Section 2-508 requires the seller to "make a conforming delivery. "20
Section 2-106(2) provides that goods are conforming "when they are
• in accordance with the obligations under the contract." 21 The
seller's obligation "under the contract" may be viewed as the provi-
sion of goods which work. The statute thus suggests that if repair
renders goods "conforming," i.e., if the defects which were the
time . . . ." Section 2-508(2) provides that cure may be made beyond that time, again if notice
is given anti if "the seller had reasonable grounds to believe" that the "non-conforming tender
. . . would be acceptable . . ." The illustrations in the text presuppose that § 2-508(1) is
applicable. It is assumed that the "contract time" extends for a: reasonable period after
delivery. See Uniform Commercial Code § 2-309(1). Buyers have a reasonable time after
delivery to decide whether to accept, Uniform Commercial Code § 2-606; and with many
goods performance is contemplated in that time. Cf. Bayne v. Nall Motors, Inc., 12 UCC
Rep. Serv. 1137 (D. Ct. Iowa 1973); Havas v. Love, 514 P.2d 1187 (Nev. 1973); Zabriskie
Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968); Bowen v. Young, 507
S.W.2d 600 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974). The analysis is unchanged under § 2-508(2), except that
this subsection arguably requires a seller to reduce the price to compensate for the costs (if
any) resulting from his failure to make a conforming tender until the time for performance had
expired. See Peters, supra note 9, at 212. As will appear below, § 2-508 otherwise apparently
allows sellers to cure only by repair or replacement, without making recompense for any other
costs their breach caused. See text at notes 20-30 infra.
I° Imposing these costs on the seller, on the other hand, may stimulate him to reduce
defects. See text at notes 36-37 infra.
2°
 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-508.
21
 Uniform Commercial Code § 2-106.
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grounds for rejection are remedied, an effective cure is made by
repair alone. 22
Some cases, moreover, read the Code this way. In Wilson v.
Scamp°li23 the buyer rejected a color television set because the
picture had "a reddish tinge. "24 The seller offered to take the set
into its shop, to repair it or, "if the set could not be made to function
properly to replace it." 25 No mention was made of a price allowance.
The buyer refused this offer because "she did not want a 'repaired
set' but another 'brand new' set." 26 The court held for the seller,
explaining:
[The adamant refusal . . . to allow inspection essential to
the determination of the cause of the excessive red tinge to
the picture defeated any effort by the seller to provide
timely repair or even replacement of the set if the difficulty
could not be corrected. The cause of the defect might have
been minor and easily adjusted or it may have been sub-
stantial and required replacement by another new set—but
the seller was never given the adequate opportunity to
make a determination. 27
The court correctly assumed that the seller, faced with the
alternatives of repair or replacement, will choose the least expensive
means to cure, but it ignored the cost to the buyer of having to
purchase a "repaired set." Had the buyer noticed the reddish tinge
while the set was in the store, she would not have paid the full new
set price for it, regardless of the seller's promise to correct the
defects. Requiring the buyer to accept a repaired set if the seller
determined that repair "corrected" the defects would impose an
unwarranted cost on the buyer and may produce economic waste. 28
22 Id.
23 228 A.2d 848 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967).
24
 Id. at 849.
25 Id.
26 Id.
22 Id. at 850.
25 Some courts recognize that "fixed goods" may not conform, even if perfectly repaired,
because of the insecurities which defects engender, and they permit buyers to refuse cure by
repair: but only when the defects are major. One court explained that "Rihe replacement of
the entire differential due to malfunction in and of itself does not constitute such a defect as
would allow a refusal of repair," but allowed the buyer to refuse cure by repair because the
malfunction occurred when the car was moving, thereby producing a "tremendous internal
impact" which could cause the buyer to be insecure about future performance. Bayne v. Nall
Motors, Inc., 12 UCC Rep. Serv. 1137, 1140, 1141 (D. Ct. Iowa 1973). See also Overland
Bond & Inv. Corp. v. Howard, 9 Ill. App. 3d 348, 292 N.E.2d 168 (1972); Zabriskie
Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968). Cf. Whaley, Tender,
Acceptance, Rejection and Revocation—The UCC's "TARR" Baby, 24 Drake L. Rev. 52,
58-59 (1974). The Code, however, apparently prohibits this distinction between major and
minor defects. Cure is done by making "a conforming delivery." Uniform Commercial Code
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Additionally, the construction of the Code by the court in
Wilson would require buyers to accept cure by replacement alone,
with no price discount for the insecurities which a prior noncon-
forming tender may have engendered. In Bartus v. Riccardi, 29 for
example, the buyer was told, at a hearing clinic, to purchase a
Model A-660 hearing aid. The seller provided a supposedly im-
proved version, the Model A-665. The buyer claimed to have been
unaware of the switch. The A-665 was unsatisfactory because it
made "noise" and "gave the buyer a headache." 3° He returned to the
clinic, "where he was informed that the hearing aid was not the
model he had been advised to buy."31 The seller, relying on section
2-508, then offered the buyer either Model A-660 or a different
A-665, but the buyer "decided that he did not want any hearing aid
from the plaintiff, and he refused to accept the tender of a replace-
ment, whether it be Model ,A-665 or A-660." 32 The buyer also made
no effort to recover his $80 downpayment until the case was ready
for trial. The court held that cure by replacement alone was
proper. 33
This seems plainly wrong. A hearing aid is a serious thing; and
when the seller supplies the wrong model, which is defective as
well, a buyer may, as this buyer did, prefer to deal elsewhere, even
at the cost of foregoing a substantial downpayment. Requiring the
buyer to accept cure by replacement, with no money allowance,
imposes an unjustified cost on him, and may produce economic
waste . 34
2-508(1). Minor defects may also engender insecurities, perhaps only "minor" ones.
Nevertheless, if sellers may cure by repair, it is because "conforming' must mean "free of the
defects that caused rejection;" insecurities are irrelevant. "Major" insecurities, attributable to
major defects, must then be as irrelevant as minor ones, because "conforming" is defined as
"fixed." Thus, the issue for judicial resolution is the efficacy of repair, not the nature of the
defects which made repair necessary. The only way to avoid this result, that sellers may
always cure by repair, is to hold that buyers may always refuse cure by repair, because
repaired goods cannot be "conforming" if they engender any insecurities. The distinction
between major and minor defects is not only prohibited by the Code, but is also unprincipled.
All defect-engendered insecurities are translatable into money and are thus costs to buyers of
defective goods. The cases provide no principle which justifies making buyers bear "minor"
costs but not "major" ones. Of practical significance, the cases also offer no principle by which
the distinction between major and minor costs can conveniently be drawn, which makes a
rule turning on that distinction of dubious utility.
29 55 Misc. 2d 3, 284 N.Y.S.2d 222 (Utica City Ct. 1967).
30
 Id. at 4, 284 N.Y.S.2d at 223.
31 Id.
32 Id. at 5, 284 N. Y.S.2d at 223.
33 Id. at 7, 284 N.Y.S.2d at 225.
34
 See also Traynor v. Walters, 342 F. Supp. 455 (M.O. Pa. 1972), where the seller made
two partially defective shipments of Scotch Pine trees, the buyer refused to take a third
shipment and the court held that the third offer, since it was timely, was a conforming
delivery and an effective cure. Id. at 460-61. Pre:code law is preferable, since it allowed a
buyer to refuse further deliveries if one was defective, although a buyer could not refuse a
later shipment of similar goods, if it was tendered under a separate contract. American Paper
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These cases are defensible only on the ground that buyers must
bear market discount and premium costs. Yet sellers offer more
than Machines; they sell myths of power, prestige and success. Some
buyers purchase the myth along with the product; they pay for that
myth and sellers take their money in return for it. Defects sometimes
destroy it, though the product be perfectly repaired; if so, the
product is worth less, at times in the market's judgment and at other
times in the judgment of particular buyers who especially cared for
"newness." No principle distinguishes these costs from others which
sellers cause, and which sales law does not require buyers to bear."
A pragmatic distinction lies in a:supposed possibility that
buyers may willfully overstate partly unprovable costs, 36 either to
avoid transactions entirely or to extort excessive price discounts.
The probabilities and dangers of such bad faith will be discussed
later. At this point, however, it can be said that when buyers are in
good faith, section 2-508 is unnecessary to prevent economic waste,
invites its production and makes possible the unjustified imposition
of breach costs on buyers. An alternative to repealing section 2-508
would be to construe or amend it to require sellers who cure to give
appropriate price discounts. But it is pointless to make the Code do
what the parties themselves can accomplish by bargaining. Section
2-508, in its present form or amended, can be supported only by the
goal of avoiding bad faith rejections. 37
& Pulp Co. v. Denenberg, 233 F.2d 610 (3d Cir. 1956); Ten Broeck Tyre Co. v. Rubber
Trading Co., 186 Ky. 526, 217 S.W. 345 (1920). See also Jerome Hardwood Lumber Co. v.
Beaumont Lumber Co., 157 Ark. 220, 247 S.W. 1059 (1923); Rock v. Gaede, 111 Kan. 214,
207 P. 323 (1922); Nicholson v. American Hide & Leather Co., 307 Mass. 456, 30 N.E.2d 376
(1940). The Code explicitly changes this law for installment contracts. Uniform Commercial
Code § 2-612.
35 Professor Llewellyn perhaps perceived aspects of this point, for he once said: "Reds-
sion for minor defect is, however, essentially an ultimate consumer's remedy: it fits the case of
the wallpaper which is just enough off-color, or the radio which is just enough off true to edge
the nerves." Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society: II, 37 Colum. L. Rev. 341, 388
(1937). Early drafts of the Code, in which Llewellyn extensively participated, apparently
limited cure to transactions between merchants. See note 37 infra.
36 Cs , the market discount, will often be objectively verifiable.
37
 Under pre-code law, a buyer could reject if the seller breached a warranty and the
property in the goods had not passed, and could rescind if the property had passed. See
Uniform Sales Act §§ 69(1)(c) & (d). What then happened respecting cure is confused. One
commentator asserted that if the contract time had not expired and the buyer had not changed
his position, the seller probably could cure. Note, 31 Colum. L. Rev. 1005 (1931). A comment
to perhaps the earliest draft of the Code, apparently written by Llewellyn, stated: "The
case-law on cure of defective tender is in utter confusion ... ;" and the draft then sought to
reproduce the commentator's version of the law -. Proposed Report On and Draft of a Revised
Uniform Sales Act § 42-A, Comment (1941 Mimeo) [hereinafter cited as 1941 Codej. This
draft also created a substantial performance rule, but only in sales between merchants and
not in sales of machinery, on the ground that such was mercantile custom. Id. § 11(2)(a),
Comment 1. By 1943, this rule was deleted and the seller's right to cure put in substantially
modern form, but the draftsmen unfortunately never explained the changes. E.g., Uniform
Commercial Code, Revised Uniform Sales Act, Third Draft § 77 (1943) [hereinafter cited as
555
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERICAL LAW REVIEW
The next section of this article will examine buyer bad faith in
both the use goods and market fluctuation goods context. This
examination will show that buyer bad faith is not sufficiently
troublesome to justify a cure rule.
HI. BUYER BAD FAITH
Buyers sometimes reject for reasons other than the non-
conformities which the goods exhibit. The issue is whether the gains
from preventing such rejections outweigh the costs of a cure rule.
Inferences drawn from plausible models of buyer behavior and the
scanty available data strongly suggest that those gains are in-
sufficient to support the continuation of a cure rule.
A. The Use Case
The initial model is a machine purchased by a business for use
in manufacturing operations. Short run price changes for machines
of this kind are negligible. Assume that the machine is delivered
with slight but quickly repairable defects so that C 1 will be zero.
Two supposedly common motives for rejection are that a sub-
stantially similar machine can be purchased elsewhere for less, or
that a better brand appears on the market. Several factors make
such rejections rare. First, the buyer must incur the expense of
making two deals. If he has particular requirements, such as a
machine to perform a specialized operation, the expense of satisfying
those requirements twice may be substantial. This occurs either
because: (1) finding nonstandard goods will often require more
searching than finding standard goods; or (2) negotiating to have
goods made or modified to meet special needs is expensive. Thus,
many buyers will stop looking after the initial purchase. Second,
goodwill is an asset the loss of which is a cost to the buyer.
Rejection for trivial defects may damage a buyer's reputation.
Third, it is probable that the first purchase was profitable or it
would not have been made. Thus, the bad faith buyer would not be
attempting to avoid a losing transaction, but to convert a good deal
into a better one. The gains from a second purchase are unlikely to
outweigh the costs of making two purchases and losing goodwill,
unless the second machine sells for substantially less or the new
1943 Codel. It has been claimed that sellers, operating against the confusing background of
pre-code law, often contracted for a right of cure. E.g., .3 S. Williston, The Law Governing
Sales of Goods at Common Law and under the Uniform Saks Act §§ 491, 611a., at 65-66,
361-62 & nn. 15, 19 (1948 ed.); Note, 31 Colum. L. Rev. 1005, 1013 (1931); Note, 28 Colum. L.
Rev. 466 (1928). For cases litigating such contracts, see, e.g., Hudson Rug Refinishing &
Cleaning Corp. v. Prime Mfg. Co., 115 F.2d 615 (7th Cir. 1940); Troendly v. J. I. Case Co.,
51 Idaho 578, 8 P.2d 276 (1932); J. I. Case Threshing Mach. Co. v. Du'worth, 216 Ky. 673,
287 S.W. 994 (1925).
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brand is significantly better. The price differential should seldom be
sufficiently large since the original sale reflected some searching of
alternatives. Although buyers lack perfect knowledge, they will
seldom miss unusually attractive deals. Similarly, radical innovation
which becomes manifest in the short interval between purchase and
delivery is rare.
This analysis also holds for consumer sales. Computerized in-
formation processing respecting consumers is becoming common,
and it facilitates the conversion of good faith purchase behavior into
an asset, the loss of which would be a cost to the consumer.
Additionally, consumer goods come in such a large number of
models and with such a variety of options that the search costs of
making two deals could often be significant. Finally, as in the
commercial situation, the first purchase would normally have been
profitable and the gains to be derived from a second purchase would
often be small. Thus, rejection for trivial defects because a better
deal can be made later is apparently an unusual phenomenon.
Significantly, bad faith rejections rarely appear in cases involving
use goods, whereas. such rejections do appear in the market fluctua-
tion context. 38
However, a perfect tender rule also makes extortion possible.
To illustrate the "innocent" version, we shall make the model used
in illustration one more realistic. In illustration one, P = $100; R =
$90; F = $50; C 1
 = 0; C2 = $20; C3 $ 10; Cs = $5 ; Cr = $ 2 ;
section 2-508 is repealed. The bargaining end point is, in fact,
indeterminate. The seller can repair (F) at a cost of $50 and will
reduce the price no more than $41, because the cost of F plus the
accompanying price reduction must be less than $92, the cost of
replacement (R + Cr). The buyer incurs breach costs of $30 (C2 +
C3 ) and will not accept a price reduction of less than $25, the sum of
breach costs less the search cost saved by repair (C s).
Assume that the buyer, either maliciously or as a bargaining
gambit, demands a price reduction of $40. The seller can roughly
value C 1 and C2, in that he can estimate the cost of repair and the
market discount of a fixed good; thus, he knows that C 1
 + C2 =
$20. He does not know C3, for the premium is personal to each
buyer, and he does not know Cs , for search costs are a function,
inter alia, of the value each buyer assigns to his . own time. The
=seller will perceive the possibility that C3 — Cs 	 $20 (in fact it
equals $5). He may then counter with a price reduction of $33 which
the buyer will certainly accept, since his total cost is $30. This
endpoint is unsatisfactory for two reasons: first, breach cost is $83
" See authorities cited in notes 41, 47 infra.
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when it should be $80, and therefore $3 of waste is produced, and
second, the seller is penalized those $3, yet buyers can obtain only
compensatory damages for breach of sales contracts. 39
The possibility of this troublesome result is nevertheless prefer-
able to a cure rule. Of the three choices—no sale, replacement or
repair—bargaining will, as it did in the model, produce the result
with the lowest cost. This the current Code cannot ensure. In
addition, the Code forces buyers to bear some breach costs. Allow-
ing bargains to operate freely will cause some sellers to bear costs in
excess of actual damages. If someone must bear a penalty, it would
seem preferable to penalize sellers rather than buyers because the
penalty increases the incentive to avoid defects and at this, sellers
usually have a comparative advantage. In other words, the penalty
is more likely to produce a desirable outcome if it is imposed on
sellers.
Moreover, penalties should occur infrequently because buyers
will generally concentrate on recovering only the costs which pro-
duced rejection. The diminution in intrinsic worth and market
discount costs are often at least approximately verifiable. It is the
premium discount and search costs which are personal to buyers,
and thus subject to extortionate manipulation. The premium cost is
primarily incurred by consumers, who seem more susceptible to
"sentimental" or "non-economic" purchase motivations. Yet con-
sumers will usually lack the sophistication needed to manage com-
plex extortionate bargains. Business buyers, on the other hand, will
have less incentive to act in this manner because C3 is not a
significant cost for them. Moreover, these buyers are aware that
their sellers can approximately value C, and C2, and are also aware
of their sellers' knowledge that premium and search costs are sus-
ceptible to manipulation. Buyer insistence on a price discount sig-
nificantly in excess of C I and C2 may thus produce suspicion,
acrimony and a loss of goodwill. Businessmen will, therefore, be
more likely to understate rather than overstate the premium dis-
count. Finally, extortion is immoral, which for many people is a
sufficient deterrent.
A second form of extortion may arise in the sale of a specialized
machine. Assume the original price of the machine is $10,000; the
cost of defects to the buyer, after repair, is $600 but because the
machine is specialized the resale value is $4,000. The buyer rejects
but offers to repurchase for $5,000. The seller's loss if he refuses is
$6,000, but if he accepts his loss is $5,000. Should he accept, we
have the economic waste and penalty noted above.
39
 Uniform Commercial Code §§ 2-711 to -15. See also Simpson, Punitive Damages For
Breach of Contract, 20 Ohio St. L.J. 284 (1959).
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Again, however, several factors indicate that this will rarely
occur. First, if the machine is specialized, the buyer will have
incurred large search costs. Should the rejection-repurchase gambit
fail, he may have to incur them again. Second, it may fail because
some sellers will not limit their cost comparisons to resale and
repurchase prices, but will also consider the gains to be derived
from establishing the principle that such actions will not succeed.
The knowledge that sellers may so act will deter some buyer bad
faith of this kind. Third, extortion is immoral. Fourth, in this case
the seller knows what the buyer is attempting; thus, the buyer will
certainly incur goodwill costs. Buyers often expect to make more
than one purchase and are not aided by the possession of a bad
name. Fifth, the original sale must have been profitable. Most
buyers will probably not run the substantial risks which extortion
poses in an attempt to convert good deals into windfalls.
Thus, like rejection for a better deal, extortion should be an
uncommon phenomenon in the use case. Moreover, the value of a
risk is the product of its likelihood (here small) and the costs it
imposes. When bad faith rejections could impose large enough costs
to make the risk of them financially significant, sellers can contrac-
tually avoid the risk. Specifically, when rejection of an expensive,
specialized machine will create enormous costs, sellers apparently
contract for a right to cure."
13. The Market Fluctuation Case
It has been demonstrated that the costs incurred by buyers who
reject in bad faith are likely to outweigh the gains derived from
such rejections in markets where prices are stable, particularly when
the goods are also to some extent tailored to particular needs.
However, when identical goods can be purchased from any seller,
and the goods need not be modified, the search costs of making two
deals are greatly reduced since, for example, a second order can be
made by phone. In addition, if the price of the goods drops radically
between sale and delivery, avoiding the deal may be profitable.
Thus, there is a danger of bad faith rejections in markets for
4° Repair and replacement clauses are standard in sales of - machinery. See Schwartz,
supra note I, at 17 n. l6. "Extortion," as used here, means to impose costs on a party which he
did not agree to bear. Buyers, then, extort when they obtain price reductions in excess of the
costs which breach imposed on them. Sellers also extort, with the assistance of the Code,
when they impose breach costs on buyers, The cost to the seller of extortion scams limited to
the loss of goodwill; but sellers may minimize this by explaining to buyers that they are doing
no more than the law allows. The possible efficacy of this explanation, the encouragement
which the Code gives, and the absence of other costs all suggest that extortion, in the sense
used above, is less risky for sellers than for buyers and will, therefore, be done more
frequently by sellers.
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standard goods which can experience large, short-term price swings.
Markets in commodities, raw materials and agricultural products
best fit this pattern:"
Two factors combine to minimize the danger of bad faith
rejections in these markets: first, the risk of rejections induced by
price fluctuations is obvious to sellers; and second, contractual avoid-
ance of such risks is relatively simple. The cases, unsurprisingly,
evidence a variety of contractual solutions to the rejection problem.
Some contracts set the price as that prevailing in an established
market at the time of performance; 42 others use liquidated damage
clauses tied to the market price, such that if price falls, buyers who
reject must pay the difference between the price at the time the
contract was made and the price at the time of rejection. 43 Such
41
 The only cases found, for example, in which buyers attempted the "rejection-
repurchase for less" gambit involved such markets. The sellers refused and successfully sued.
C. C. Mengel & Bro. Co. v. Handy Chocolate Co., 10 F.2d 293 (1st Cir. 1926), cert. denied,
271 U.S. 668 (1926) (cocoa); Cobb Lumber Co. v. Sunny S. Grain Co., 36 Ga. 140, 135 S.E.
759 (1926) (feed-stuff); McNeff v. White Eagle Brewing Co., 294 Ill. App. 37, 13 N.E.2d 493
(1938) (hops); Fielding v. Robertson, 141 Va. 123, 126 S.E. 231 (1925) (cottonseed meal). But
cf. Cain v. Grosshans Sr Peterson, Inc., 196 Kan. 497, 413 P.2d 98 (1966). •
For other illustrations of cases in which market fluctuations were sufficiently important to
be noted, see, e.g., LeRoy Dyal Co. v. Allen, 161 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1947) (potatoes);
Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co. v. Stover Mfg. & Engine Co., 37 F.2d 876 (7th Cir. 1929) (pig
iron); Cub Fork Coal Co. v. Fairmont Glass Works, 33 F.2d 420 (7th Cir. 1929) (coal);
Buchman v. Millville Mfg. Co., 17 F.2d 983 (2d Cir. 1927) (cottonyarn); Higgins v. California
Prune & Apricot Growers, Inc., 16 F.2d 190 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 781 (1926) (dried
prunes); Griffin Grocery Co. v. Richardson, 10 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1926) (sorghum); Erie Food
Prods. Co. v. Interocean Mercantile Corp., 299 F. 71 (6th Cir. 1924) (sugar); Garcia &
Maggini Co. v. Washington Dehydrated Food Co., 294 F. 765 (9th Cir. 1924) (evaporated
apples); Rand v. Morse, 289 F. 339 (8th Cir. 1923) (rice); A. Klipstein & Co. v. Dilsizian, 273
F. 473 (2d Cir. 1921) (gum arabic); Cossins v: Herschel Cal. Fruit Prods. Co., 103 Cal. App.
524, 284 P. 1038 (1930) (tomatoes); Consolidated Flour Mills Co. v. Di Marco, 18 La. App.
292, 136 So. 657 (1931) (flour); Wehmeier v. Youtz, 215 Mo. App, 240, 256 S.W. 145 (1923)
(hogs); Planters Nut & Chocolate Co. v. Douglas Candy Co., 240 S.W. 473 (Mo. App. 1922)
(peanuts); Mercer Tube & Mfg. Co. v. American Zinc Sales Co., 258 App. Div. 506, 17
N.Y.S.2d 132, aff'd, 284 N.Y. 636, 30 N.E.2d 491 (1940) (zinc); Otto Seidenburg, Inc. v.
Tautfest, 155 Ore. 420, 64 P.2d 534 (1937) (hops); Fielding v. Robertson, 141 Va. 123, 126
S.E. 231 (1925) (cottonseed meal). But see Forsyth Furniture Lines, Inc. v. Druckman, 8 F.2d
212 (4th Cir. 1925) (signs of an approaching collapse in the furniture market, but probably
caused by depression of 1920).
42
 E.g., Louisville Soup Co. v. Taylor, 279 F. 470 (6th Cir. 1922) (price was $.50 per 280
lbs. over the official closing market price at Savannah on date seller received order); Maxwell
Planting Co. v. A.P. Loveman & Co., 212 Ala. 293, 102 So. 45 (1924); Beyer v. Saginaw
Creamery Co., 358 Mich. 284, 100 N.W.2d 441 (1960); Planters Nut & Chocolate Co. v.
Douglas Candy Co., 240 S.W. 473 (Mo. App. 1922); Buret v. Vogelstein & Co., 188 App.
Div. 605, 177 N.Y.S. 402 (1919).
43
 One such contract, for the sale of flour, provided that if the buyer refused to send
shipping instructions, the seller could terminate and recover the carrying cost and selling cost:
[P]lus or minus the difference between the market value of a bushel of cash wheat at
mill on the date of sale and on the date of termination, multiplied by 4.6 times the
number of barrels of flour. This amount is to be added if the price of cash wheat is
lower, and subtracted if the price of cash wheat is higher, upon the date of
termination.
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clauses make explicit the contract's risk shifting function, as well as
the seller's intention to hold the buyer to his obligations. In other
cases the parties treat the risk of bad faith rejection directly. Sales
contracts create a discount for particular quality defects, thereby
impliedly requiring acceptance; 44 provide for substantial perfor-
mance with permissible variations; 45 make an inspection certificate
of a third party conclusive respecting performance; 46 or explicitly
eliminate or limit the right of rejection.'"
However, the cases only indicate what some parties do, not
what most of them do. Professor Honnold, some years ago, sur-
veyed the rules of certain commodities exchanges, finding that price
adjustment, rather than rejection, was the standard remedy for
quality defects." An examination of the rules of some of those
exchanges, along with certain other exchanges, revealed a variety of
solutions to the bad faith rejection problem. Almost all exchanges
set quality standards with permissible variations. 49 Many exchanges
Colorado Milling & Elevator Co. v. Rapides Grocery Co., 142 So. 626, 627 (La. App. 1932).
See also Russell Miller Milling Co. v. McLean, 48 S.D. 198, 203 N.W. 498 (1925).
44
 E.g., Apex Mining Co. v. Chicago Copper & Chem. Co., 306 F.2d 725 (8th Cir.
1962); Eugene B. Smith & Co. v. Russek, 212 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1954) (custom read into
contract); Memhard v. Alfred Gabrielsen Co., 224 Ky. 238, 5 S.W.2d 1070 (1928) (custom
read into contract); Swift & Co. v. New Roads Oil Mill & Mfg, Co., 148 La. 1009, 88 So. 250
(1921).
45 E.g., Baer Bros. Land & Cattle Co. v. Reed, 197 F.2d 569 (10th Cir. 1952); Western
Elec. Co. v. Williams Sales Co., 236 F. Supp. 73 (M.D.N.C. 1964); Thach v. Durham, 120
Colo. 253, 208 P.2d 1159 (1949); Gile v. Tsutakawa, 109 Wash. 366, 187 P. 323 (1920).
46 E.g., Bartlett & Co. v. Grain Merchants Co. 323 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1963); Rand v.
Morse, 289 F. 359 (8th Cir. 1923); Texas Star Flour Mills Co. v. Moore, 177 F. 744 (W.D.
Mo. 1910); Hind v. Willich, 127 Misc. 355, 216 N.Y.S. 155 (S. Ct. 1926); Stone v. Blue Ridge
Tie Co., 7 Tenn. App. 670 (1927).
47
 E.g., Schuman Co. v. Nelson, 219 F.2d 627 (3d Cir. 1955); LeRoy Dyal Co. v. Allen,
161 F.2d 152 (4th Cir. 1947); Continental Forest Prods., Inc. v. White Lumber Sales, Inc.,
256 Ore. 466, 474 P.2d 1 (1970).
An additional deterrent to rejecting for minor quality defects is that when courts believe.
that the actual case of rejection is market decline, buyers generally seem to lose. E.g., Griffin
Grocery Co. v. Richardson, 10 F.2d 467 (8th Cir. 1926); Colorado Milling & Elevator Co. v.
Rapides Grocery Co., 142 So, 626 (La. App. 1932); Consolidated Flour Mills Co. v. DiMarco,
18 La. App. 292, 136 So. 657 (1931); Otto Seidenberg, Inc. v. Tautfest, 155 Ore. 420, 64 P.2d
534 (1937); Rector v. DeArana, 398 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. 1966). Buyers do no better, in the
context of a market decline, when they raise trivial objections to the manner of tender or fail
to send shipping instructions. E.g., Erie Food Prods. Co. v. Interoccan Mercantile Corp., 299
F. 71 (6th Cir. 1924); Colonial Ice Cream Co. v. lnterocean Mercantile Corp., 296 F. 316 (3d
Cir. 1924); Garcia & Maggini Co. v. Washington Dehydrated Food Co., 294 F. 765 (9th Cir.
1924); Rand v. Morse, 289 F. 359 (8th Cir. 1923); A. Klipsteins Co. v. Dilsizian, 273 F. 473
(2d Cir.), cert, denied, 257 U.S. 639 (1921); Mathieu v. George A. Moore & Co., 4 F.2d 251
(N.D. Cal. 1925), affd, 13 F.2d 747 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 273 U.S. 733 (1926). See also
authorities cited in note 41 supra; Eno, Price Movements and Unstated Objections to the
Defective Performance of Sales Contracts, 44 Yale L. J. 782 (1935). But the costs of litigation
and the frequent great geographical separations between buyers and sellers reduce the deter-
rent effect of law suits.
Honnold, supra note 8, at 464-65 & n.35.
49
 For example, a satisfactory delivery of frozen pork bellies on the Minneapolis Grain
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explictly establish price discounts for grade variations. 50 Almost all
provide for "official inspections" by federal or other designated
officials respecting quality and weight, with sales made conditional
upon receipt of inspection certificates. In some cases these cer-
tificates are conclusive as to quality," while in other cases a party
may call for "reinspection," which is done promptly by experts
whose decision is final. 52 Commodities contracts also often explicitly
limit or preclude rejection." Business buyers sometimes hedge
against the risk of price fluctuation."
Thus, bad faith rejections in the fluctuating market case ap-
parently occur only in unusual situations. A use goods market, for
example, may be converted into a fluctuating goods market by war,
Exchange must "show 31 or less minor defects," which are explicitly defined. Rules and
Regulations of the Minneapolis Grain Exchange, Rule 1704 [hereinafter cited as Minneapolis].
See also American Cotton Waste Exchange, Trading Rules, Article II, §§ 1-9 [hereinafter
cited as American]; Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Board of Trade, e.g., Rules 291,
903, 919, Regulations 1148, 1479, 1576-84, 8001, 8020 [hereinafter cited as Chicago]; Rules of
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Rules 1203-04, 1301, 1304, 1604, 1901, 1904, S 1301-02
[hereinafter cited as Chicago M.]; Rules And Bylaws of The Dallas Cotton And Commodity
Exchange, Rules for Arbitration and Appeal IV(d), (g), Trade Rules 6, 8 [hereinafter cited as
Dallas]; Greenwood Cotton Exchange, Rules 18, 30 [hereinafter cited as Greenwood]; Min-
neapolis, supra, Rule 1002, Regulation 2019; New York Mercantile Exchange, Revised Maine
Potato Futures Contract §§ 51.03-.04 [hereinafter cited as NYME Potato]; New York Mer-
cantile Exchange, Information And Rules In Brief [hereinafter cited as NYME] Silver Coin
Futures 3; Platinum Futures 4; Palladium Futures 2; Imported Frozen Fresh Boneless Beef
Futures 4-5; By-Laws And Rules, Commodity Exchange, Inc., New York City, By-Laws §§
912-15, 927, 986 [hereinafter cited as Comm. N.Y.].
50
 Chicago, supra note 49, e.g., Rules 283(d), 293, 294, Regulation 1104(3); Chicago M.,
supra note 49, e.g., Rules 1204(BXC), 1304(B), 1604(B), S 1303; Comm. N.Y., supra note 49,
By-Laws §§ 932(h), 947(g); Minneapolis, supra note 49, Rule 1003; NYME, supra note 49, at
4-5; Constitution Rules and Regulations of The St. Joseph Grain Exchange, Article XVIII, §
11 [hereinafter cited as St. Joseph].
51
 NYME Potato, supra note 49, § 51.14. See also NYME, supra note 49, Platinum, at
6; Palladium, at 4.
52 E.g., Chicago, supra note 49, Rule 344, Regulations 926-27, 1104(1)(a);.Chicago M.,
supra note 49, Rule 1905; Comm. N.Y., supra note 49, By-Laws §§ 932(h), 947(g); Min-
neapolis, supra note 49, Rule 1316; St. Joseph, supra note 50, Article XVIII § 20.
53
 For example, the New York Mercantile Exchange provides that, in sales of imported,
frozen, fresh, boneless beef futures, "any buyer who fails to accept delivery pursuant to
Exchange By-Laws and Rules shall be in default. . . ." NYME, supra note 49, Beef, at 10.
Accord, id., Platinum, at 6; Palladium, at 4; Silver Coin, at 7; NYME Potato, supra note 49,
§ 51.13(a). See also Greenwood, supra note 49, Rules 16, 19, 20, 32; American, supra note 49,
Article III, § 3.
54
 Commodities exchanges sometimes provide for compulsory arbitration of disputes
under sales contracts between members. E.g., Dallas, Rules For Arbitrations And Appeals,
supra note 49, I; Minneapolis, supra note 49, Rule 600; St. Joseph, supra note 50, Article VIII
§ 3. In addition, the rules of the New York Mercantile Exchange provide that if a buyer
refuses to take delivery, the President or his agent shall sell in the cash market the goods the
buyer refused, hold the buyer for the difference between the delivery price and the amount
received, and charge the buyer a penalty of at least $100 per contract plus brokerage and
expenses. If the buyer is judgment proof, the clearing house is liable to the seller for any loss
sustained. E.g., NYME, supra note 49, Beef, at 11; Platinum, at 7. Other exchanges have
similar rules. See Chicago M., supra note 49, Rules 1109, S 1311; Comm. N.Y., supra note
49, By-Laws §§ 406, 932(h), 947(g).
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peace or depression," or an ignorant seller entering into contracts
not regulated by a commodity exchange may fail to protect himself.
Ignorance, however, is apparently decreasing in recent years; Sales
Act cases in the period 1936-56 indicate a decline in bad faith
rejections, and since 1956 few examples exist. 56
C. The Choices
In summary, a cure rule is unnecessary to avoid economic
waste when buyers act in good faith, since bargaining will optimize
breach costs. Moreover, the Code as currently written invites courts
to impose breach costs on buyers unjustifiably and to produce the
economic waste it is intended to avoid. When buyers act in bad
faith, however, limitations on their right to reject will prevent some
55 This may have occurred in Virginia Shipbuilding Corp. v. United States Shipping Bd.,
292 F. 440 (E.D. Va. 1923), affd, 22 F.2d 38 (4th Cir. 1927). The company, on December 7,
1917, agreed to build cargo ships for the Government. By September 25, 1919, the ships'
value had increased greatly because "freight rates were at their peak, and the government had
already discontinued its shipbuilding policy." 292 F. at 453. The company then agreed to
repurchase the ships. Prices, however, soon thereafter rapidly declined, apparently as a result
of generally depressed conditions in the war's aftermath, so that by the spring of 1921 the
ships "were a drug on the market, and could not be profitably operated at all . . ." Id. The
company unsuccessfully refused to comply with the repurchase agreement. See also Forsyth
Furniture Lines, Inc. v. Druckman, 8 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1925). A somewhat different
example of an unanticipated disaster is given in Denison Mines, Ltd. v. Michigan Chem.
Corp., 469 F.2d 1301 (7th Cir. 1972). A buyer of "yttrium oxide," which it refined and resold
for use in color television tubes, made an apparent (and unsuccessful) bad faith rejection
"because of technological changes in the television industry [which caused] the demand for the
refined product [to] evaporate." Id. at 1303. These changes seemed sudden and unanticipated,
Finally, although the large number of bad faith rejections in the sugar cases in the early 1920's
appear to contradict my thesis, because sugar is known to fluctuate in value, those rejections
also resulted from extraordinary events. The dislocations in sugar markets produced by the
First World War and its aftermath led to "the most violent price decline ever recorded in
sugar . ," which neither sellers nor buyers anticipated. Case study, Cancellation, 2 Harv.
Bus. Rev. 496, 498 (1924).
56
 Apart from Denison Mines Ltd. v. Michigan Chem. Corp., 469 F.2d 1301 (7th Cir.
1972), research unearthed only two cases in which, against falling markets, buyers sought to
avoid deals on the ostensible ground of quality defects. American Produce Co. v. Marion
Creamery & Poultry Co., 214 Ore. 103, 327 P.2d 1104 (1958); Rector v. DeArana, 398 S.W.2d
911 (Tex. 1966). But in neither case was there any evidence of bad faith except the market
decline itself, and both buyers lost.
The decline in bad faith rejection cases may be attributable to the increased use of
contracts regulating rejection or. the Code, which creates a right of cure. The former is
probably the cause. The decline in cases between 1936-56 cannot be attributed to the Code.
Moreover, as Professor Honnold has pointed out, cure is no help to a distant seller when his
buyer rejects on a falling market—the most troublesome case—since the market decline
requires cure to be made rapidly, but the distance precludes this. Honnold, supra note 8, at
424. Such statutes as the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 499a, et seq.
(1970), passed in 1930, which authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to adjudicate contract
disputes involving many agricultural products and encourages sellers to preclude rejection by
contract, and the growing commercial sophistication of sellers, as reflected in the commodities
rules cited in notes 49-54 supra, seem the more likely cause of the decline in cases. The earliest
draft of § 2-508 was almost entirely concerned with bad faith rejection on a falling market.
1941 Code, supra note 37, § 42-A, Comment A. See also Handbook Of The National
Conference On Uniform State Laws And Proceedings 176 (1943). The current cure rule may
be medicine for a disease which has largely disappeared.
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economic waste. But bad faith is rare and partially avoidable by
contract in the use goods market; and an obvious danger which is
almost completely avoidable by contract in the market fluctuation
case. This suggests four possible changes: (1) repeal section 2-508; (2)
amend section 2-508 to provide that a seller may cure only if he
gives -an appropriate price discount; 57 (3) limit the application of
section 2-508 to the situation where buyer bad faith is shown; or (4)
limit the application of section 2-508 to the market fluctuation case,
where bad faith rejections may present a serious problem. An
analysis of the last three alternatives should indicate the desirability
of the first.
The advantage of requiring appropriate price discounts is that
the Code, in theory, will then approximate the results of bargaining
when buyers are in good faith, and will ameliorate the results of bad
faith. The relevant cost calculations, however, will be quite difficult
to make. Recall illustration one above, where price = $350; P =
$100; R = $90; F $50; C 1
 = 0; C2 = $20; C3 = $10. Assume the
seller offers to repair and reduce the price by $10, the buyer refuses,
and the seller sues. The case could present the following factual
issues: (1) the seller claims that C2, the market discount, is actually
$10; (2) the seller claims that C3, the premium to buy a "fixed good,"
is actually zero, but the buyer is practicing extortion; (3) the buyer
claims that replacement cost is actually $40, and he is entitled to a
new range; (4) the buyer claims that repair cost is actually $30, but
the seller is surreptitiously shifting breach costs to him. The com-
plexity of these issues may result in time consuming and costly
litigation. Indeed, the expense of litigation may outweigh the possi-
ble gains, so that the parties will either forego it or not adequately
develop their case. Should the latter occur, the price discount set by
the court may be arbitrary. Moreover, the results of litigation will
often be unpredictable at the time the rejection decision must be
made. The buyer will probably be ignorant of the seller's costs; the
seller cannot be sure of a court or jury's ability to distinguish
57 Professors White and Summers suggest that § 2-508 should be read to permit sellers to
cure by giving a price allowance, although they concede that this does "modest violence . . . to
the language . ." because businessmen allow such cures. White & Summers, supra note 8, §
8-4, at 269. Although some businessmen do so, the fact cannot, of itself, support the
conclusion that the Code should make the option available in all contexts. This author
contends that a mandatory price discount rule would be unwise. See text at notes 57-58 infra.
Moreover, allowing cure by price allowance is unlikely to have been the draftsmen's intention,
and pre-Code law seems contrary. The Second Circuit once remarked:
We know of no rule of law which justifies the position taken below that merchandise
which is unmerchantable must be accepted by the buyer, if an allowance be granted
on the purchase price. The goods tendered are either merchantable or unmerchant-
able, and if they be unmerchantable, it is not a delivery within the requirements of
the contract.
In re A.W. Cowen & 13ros., Inc., 11 F.2d 692, 694 (2d Cir. 1926).
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between a good faith request for a premium discount and an at-
tempt at extortion; and so forth. An important function of sales law
is to provide the parties with clear guidance as to what they can and
cannot do. A price discount rule will probably do the contrary.
A similar argument may be made against limiting the applica-
tion of section 2-508 to the situation where the buyer acts in bad
faith. The problem for a court is to distinguish bad faith from good,
and for the parties to know the bases on which a court will draw
such a distinction. Both will be quite difficult and, therefore, a rule
turning on the distinction would be undesirable.
Limiting cure to the market fluctuation case is also unsatisfac-
tory. The parties must be notified in advance into which category
they fall. Incorporating a list of markets into the Code seems cum-
bersome and inflexible. Advance notification, moreover, will not
resolve a substantial number of cases, for bad faith rejections seem
troublesome primarily when a normally stable use goods market is
converted into a fluctuating market by the pressure of extraordinary
events which are seldom foreseeable.
Moreover, a cure rule may be inappropriate for market fluctua-
tion rejections. In many cases an unforeseen risk will have
materialized, creating a situation in which amicable resolution is
impossible. Such cases, reflecting a breakdown of normal commer-
cial dealings, should be handled by reference to current conceptions
of morality as applied to the parties' peculiar circumstances. No
specific rule, such as that requiring cure, will always be appropriate
because of the impossibility of visualizing, when the rule is created,
many of the situations to which it is to apply. Section 1-103 states
that, unless the Code provides otherwise, "the law merchant . . .
shall supplement its provisions."58 Use of that amorphous concept to
modify the perfect tender rule should produce wiser solutions to
those bad faith rejection problems than those reached under section
2-508. 59
58 Uniform Commercial Code § 1-103.
59 Recourse to the "law merchant" gives a seller against whom a rejection has been made
little guidance as to his chances in a lawsuit, but at least the parties know rejection is
permissible. Also, when catastrophe occurs, giving the courts flexibility would appear to be
the wisest course.
Section 2-612, concerning installment contracts, also modifies the perfect tender rule.
Section 2-612(2) authorizes buyers to reject a non-conforming installment only if "the non-
conformity substantially impairs the value of that installment and cannot be cured . . . ."
However, buyers must nevertheless accept if "the seller gives adequate assurance of [the
defect's] cure . . ." How a seller may give "adequate assurance" that he will cure a
non-conformity which "cannot be cured" is unexplained. Furthermore, § 2-612 requires
buyers to accept defective tenders, and this cannot be justified by any characteristics of
installment sales. Cf. Honnold, supra note 8, at 476-78. The section should, therefore, be
amended. Two other Code sections, § 2-504 . and § 2-614, curtail the perfect tender rule for
minor alterations in the manner of tender. Those sections may also be subject to the
objections noted above, but that is beyond the scope of this article,
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IV. REVOCATION OF ACCEPTANCE
The goods in most market fluctuation cases are quickly resold
or consumed, whereas, in most use cases, goods are retained for a
substantial period of time. As a result, there is a greater likelihood
of quality defects surfacing after acceptance in transactions involv-
ing use goods. Section 2-608 provides that a buyer may "revoke his
acceptance" of a product "whose nonconformity substantially im-
pairs its value to him" if he accepted the good in reasonable ignor-
ance of the nonconformity or in the reasonable expectation that the
seller would cure the defect. "A buyer who so revokes has the same
rights . . . with regard to the goods . . . as if he had rejected
them." 6°
The substantial impairment limitation is meant "to preclude
revocation for trivial defects or defects which may be easily cor-
rected."61 The section thus attempts to eliminate bad faith revoca-
tions and the economic waste which allegedly results from reversing
completed transactions for slight breaches. Neither of these goals
justifies the substantial impairment limitation, for the same reasons
as those enumerated above with respect to section 2-508.
Without the limitation, buyers would be able to revoke for any
quality defects. The parties would then bargain respecting breach
costs just as they bargained in the rejection context, the only differ-
ence being that the value of some cost categories will change, largely
because bargains will concern used goods. These changes, however,
do not affect the principle that the parties will optimize breach
costs. The Code is again unnecessary to avoid economic waste.
Moreover, the substantial impairment limitation requires buyers to
continue with deals although they have not been compensated for
certain breach costs; the unsatisfactory implications of this position
have already been explored. Finally, the danger of bad faith revoca-
tions is slight. A rigorous demonstration of these points nevertheless
requires a second set of models, because the Code affects bargains
conducted in the revocation context in subtly different ways from
those in the rejection context. 62
6° Uniform Commercial Code § 2-608.
Rozmus v. Thompson's Lincoln-Mercury Co., 209 Pa. Super. 120, 124, 224 A.2d 782,
784 (1966).
62 The purposes which the text attributes to the substantial impairment limitation are
unnecessary to achieve § 2-608's original aims, which were: (1) to deprive sellers of price
offsets to damage claims, since buyers who accept are liable for the price; and (2) to allow
buyers both to rescind and to recover damages. The earliest draft of the section allowed
revocation for any quality defect. See Report And Second Draft: The Revised Uniform Sales
Act § 68-B & accompanying Comment (1941). The 1943 version provided that a buyer may
revoke if "a hidden defect deprives him of the substantial benefit of the contract." 1943 Code,
supra note 37, § 98d. By 1944 the phrase became "substantially impairs its value to him."
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A. Preventing Economic Waste
Recall the gas range model, but assume the defects.appear after
acceptance. The cost categories are identical to those developed
above, but the values may change. The costs to the seller of a lost
sale or replacement will probably be higher because the transaction
must be reopened, and returned used goods are worth less than
returned new goods. The buyer's breach costs are substantially the
same, except that non-use cost may be higher if the machine has
replaced another, and the market discount and premium demanded
because the item is "fixed" should be lower because the goods are
now used. We assume: (1) that the buyer may rescind for any defect,
as under the Uniform Sales Act; 63 (2) that price remains constant;
and (3) that repair is successful.
1. P = $105; R = $95; F = $50; C I = 0; C2 = $10; C3 = $5; C„
= $5. Without the Code, the seller will repair and reduce the price
by a maximum of $15 (F + XC = $50 + 0 + $10 + $5 = $65).
Breach costs are optimized, and are lower than in the rejection case.
2. The costs are the same, except that repair cost (F) is $88.
The seller will replace, for the total cost of repair is $103 (F + XC =
$88 + $10 + $5) while R = $95. Again, the least expensive alterna-
tive is selected, but breach costs are higher than in the rejection case
partly because seller reversal costs are higher.
Let section 2-608 be applicable to examples three through six.
There are four significant possibilities, only one of them good.
3. Assume that (1) without repair, the defects are sufficiently
substantial to enable the buyer to revoke; (2) repair reduces C, to
zero; (3) although the defects are substantial, the fact that C1 can be
reduced to zero precludes revocation if the seller repairs; 64 and (4) as
with cure, if the seller repairs, - he need not compensate, the buyer for
any breach costs which remain. In illustration one, where F = $50,
breach costs will be approximately the same under the Code as those
incurred through bargaining, but the buyer unjustifiably bears $15
of these costs because the seller will not reduce the price. In
illustration two, the seller will also repair without reducing the
price, yielding breach costs of $103 (F = $88; C2 = $10; C3 = $5),
$15 of which are, again, unjustifiably borne by the buyer. In this
case, however, economic waste is produced since the least expensive
alternative, replacement, costs $95.
American Law Institute, Uniform Revised Sales Act § 98 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1944).
The draftsmen never explained this addition.
63 L. Vold, Handbook of the Law of Sales § 95 (2d. ed. 1959); Williston, supra note 37,
§§ 608a, 610, at 345-47, 350-54.
64 Some courts apparently so hold. E.g., Rozmus v. Thompson's Lincoln-Mercury Co.,
209 Pa, Super. 120, 224 A,2d 782 (1966).
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4. Let assumption 3 of illustration 3 be changed to permit
revocation, despite the efficacy of repair. Here the buyer is in the
illustration one situation, where the seller has no right to keep him
in the deal. This is satisfactory. 	 -
5. Assume (1) C I , before repair, is only $10 (the defects are
slight), C2 = $10; C3= $5; C. = $5; and (2) under the Code, only C 1
is relevant, and it is low enough to preclude revocation. If the Code
were repealed, the buyer would rescind. Since iC = $25 the seller
would reduce the price by $25 to $30 to keep the deal. (Recall that F
= $50; R = $95; P = $105). Breach cost is this reduction. If the
Code is applicable and the buyer cannot revoke, breach cost is $25.
The Code thus produces no economic waste, but it unjustifiably
imposes this cost upon the buyer.
6. Assume (1) C 1 , before repair, is $60 but all other costs are
the same; and (2) again only C 1
 is relevant, and it is held to be
insubstantial. The buyer not only bears breach costs of $75 (IC),
but economic waste is produced since, if the buyer could revoke, the
seller would repair and reduce the price, expending a maximum of
$65 (F + IC, when C 1
 = 0 because of repair.)
The results in illustration three rest on the inability of buyers to
revoke if repair is possible. They are the results which the Code
invites because of its emphasis on cure and obvious distaste for
revocation; yet these results seem erroneous, for the statute suggests
that the right to cure does not survive acceptance. 65 Should the
cases which facilitate the results in illustration three be overruled,
the Code remains troublesome, since its emphasis on substantial
impairment and on "conforming"' tenders again invites courts to
ignore nonuse, market discount and premium costs. 66 Finally, sec-
tion 2-608 makes the result in illustration six possible because the
phrase "substantial" is apparently irreducibly ambiguous. Is a $60
cost on a $350 purchase substantial? If not, what would be? How is
65
 Section 2-508(1) authorizes cure only during "the time for performance." That time
will generally have expired when the buyer attempts to revoke. Sections 2-508(1) & (2) also
suggest that cure may only be made after rejection. Thus § 2-508(2) begins: "Where the buyer
rejects a non-conforming tender ... the seller may . . ." However, § 2-608(3) provides that
buyers who revoke have "the same ... duties with regard to the goods involved as if .. .
[they] had rejected them." This probably refers to § 2-603, which specifies the duties, such as
following reasonable seller instructions, imposed on rejecting merchant buyers; but it is at
least arguable that one of the § 2-608(3) duties is to accept cure, if it can be made in
conformity with the requirements of § 2-508. See Phillips, Revocation of Acceptance and the
Consumer Buyer, 75 Corn. L.J. 354, 357 (1970); Note, 6 Rutgers Cam. L.J. 387, 414-15
(1974). If that construction obtains, illustration three above may become common, and
illustration four rare.
66
 Some courts apparently have adopted the invitation. See Akron Brick & Block Co. v.
Moniz Eng'r Co., — Mass. —, 310 N.E.2d 128 (1974); Rozmus v. Thompson's Lincoln-
Mercury Co., 209 Pa. Super. 120, 224 A.2d 782 (1966); Reece v. Yeager Ford Sales, Inc., 184
S.E.2d 722 (W. Va. 1971). Cf. Collum v. Fred Tuch Buick, 6 Ill. App. 3d 217, 11 UCC Rep.
Serv. 333 (1972).
568
CURE AND REVOCATION FOR QUALITY DEFECTS
one to know? Unsurprisingly, the courts have developed no criteria
to resolve these issues. 67 The Code, therefore, once more bears no
relevance to the goal of reducing economic waste, and it causes
harm. 68
B. Bad Faith
Bad faith revocations caused by the opportunity to make a
better deal later will be rare, for the same reasons that rejections on
this ground are rare. 69 A second motive for bad faith revocation
may be that the buyer, after use, decides that the goods are not
what he "really wanted," although the defects would not have
caused revocation if performance were subjectively satisfactory.
Conditioning revocation on the existence of substantial defects helps
prevent this behavior. For several reasons, however, this problem is
not serious. First, bad faith revocations for trivial defects may be
deterred by section 2 -607(4), which requires buyers to establish "any
breach with respect to the goods accepted," 70 and by section
2 -608(2), which requires revocation to be "within a reasonable time
after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the ground for
it," and which precludes revocation when there has been "any
substantial change in condition of the goods ... not caused by their
own defects." 7 I
Second, in the revocation case the seller usually has possession
of some or all of the purchase price. If he suspects bad faith, he is
unlikely to return it voluntarily. Thus, a buyer who merely changes
his mind about the deal may often have to sue to recover the price.
This should deter light-hearted revocations. Third, when the defects
themselves are not troublesome it is generally less costly for buyers
to continue with a deal. If, for example, a business buyer has
For an interesting example of judicial struggle with these questions, see Campbell v.
Pollack, 101 R.I. 223, 221 A.2d 615 (1966).
68 Illustrations 5 and 6 may seem unrealistic because the seller, by delivering defective
goods and not curing, has breached, thereby enabling the buyer to recover the difference
between the goods value as warranted and as accepted under § 2-714(2). This objection is
unsound for two reasons. First, since the costs at issue are not "substantial," they often may
not be great enough to make litigation worthwhile, which means that buyers will continue to
bear them. Second, relying on litigation to enable buyers to shift costs back to sellers is
inefficient, because litigation is generally more costly than bargains. However, when part of
the purchase price is unpaid, buyers may withhold payments, pursuant to § 2-717, to force
price reductions. This seems satisfactory, except that the practice may require more commer-
cial sophistication than some consumer buyers have, and an ability to withstand seller threats
which some may lack. Of greater significance, it is erroneous to defend § 2-608 by showing
that another Code section can be used on occasion to ameliorate its defects, when those
defects can be eliminated by deleting the offending statutory clause with no loss to the values
the Code seeks to achieve.
69 See text in Pt. III, at 556-65 supra.
" Uniform Commercial Code § 2-607.
71
 Id. § 2-608(2).
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installed a machine, he would rather use it than buy another, for
repurchase increases search costs and the interim between revoca-
tion and repurchase may disrupt operations. Also, overcoming
inertia—revoking, searching again, making and receiving threats,
calling lawyers—entails substantial costs. The facts in many cases
thus reveal serious efforts on the part of buyers to have sellers
correct defects, with revocation a last resort. 72 Thus, the danger of
buyers revoking because they have changed their minds seems
slight.
The final potentially significant form of buyer bad faith, the
seeking of extortionate price decreases, seems somewhat less likely
in this situation than in the rejection case. Such conduct is primarily
engaged in, if at all, by businessmen, for consumers probably lack
the sophistication. In addition to the deterrents noted above, busi-
ness buyers for use also face reversal costs; for example, returning a
machine which has already been integrated into plant operations
may be expensive.
C. The Choices
The substantial impairment limitation is unnecessary to avoid
economic waste and, in fact, it may produce waste. In addition, it
often leads to the unjustifiable imposition of breach costs on buyers;
and it is dysfunctionally ambiguous. The limitation will ameliorate
the effects of buyer bad .
 faith, but analysis indicates that bad faith
should be even less common here than in the rejection case. Once
again, the Code sweeps too broadly. Amending the Code to allow
revocation for any defects unless sellers give appropriate price dis-
counts is as unsatisfactory as the similar rule in the rejection con-
text. Using a substantial impairment rule only when a buyer may be
in bad faith seems similarly unacceptable. Consider, for example,
the difficulty of determining whether revocation was motivated by
the buyer's second thoughts or by the defects which actually exist.
The best choice, therefore, is to eliminate the substantial impair-
ment limitation.
V. CONTRACTING OUT
A. Rejection
If section 2-508 is repealed, many sellers will attempt to limit
rejection rights contractually. As a result, the point at which bar-
gaining occurs will shift, so that the parties will be bargaining about
72
 E.g., Orange Motors, Inc. v. Dade County Dairies, Inc., 258 So. 2d 319 (Fla. App.
1972); Overland Bond & Inv. Corp. v. Howard, 9 I11. App. 3d 348, 11 UCC Rep. Serv. 945
(1972); Zoss v. Royal Chevrolet, Inc., 11 UCC Rep. Serv. 527 (Ind. Super. Ct. 1972).
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the risks arising from the possibility of breach rather than the costs
a particular breach has already caused. Bargains cannot be rational
unless information respecting their subject matter is available. In-
formation as to breach costs, we have seen, is generally available.
However, information respecting the risks of breach may not be.
When information is unavailable, bargains as to these risks should
be prohibited by the state; that is, sellers should be able to avoid the
perfect tender rule only when buyers possess the information neces-
sary to value the relevant risks or when sellers provide information
to buyers who now lack it. 73 Because different limitations on the
right to reject make different facts relevant, this point will be
developed through an analysis of the common means of limiting
rejection.
Sellers sometimes deal on the basis of certificates of compliance
issued by neutral third parties who are named in the contract. These
certificates are either final, or can be impeached only by other third
parties whose authority the buyer is entitled to invoke. This practice
should always be permitted. Only the third party's competence and
integrity need be judged, and buyers can usually ascertain these.
Other limitations make different information relevant. Assume
the contract accompanying the sale of a television set requires
buyers to accept although the fine tuner is defective, but reduces the
price by $10 in this event. The breach cost categories are as de-
scribed above. When the sale is made, a buyer faces a risk that the
fine tuner will not work. The value of that risk (N) is the product of
the probability of defects (p) and their cost; that is, N = p/C. The
buyer must know whether $10 accurately reflects the risk of a
defective fine tuner: if pIC is less than $10 he should purchase;
whereas, if p/C is greater than $10 he should demand a further
price reduction. Most buyers can value the market discount and
premium costs of a television set with a defective fine tuner. The
costs of repair would also be ascertainable; a prospective buyer can
phone a repair shop. Buyers with testing facilities, or those who
purchase a substantial number of sets, will be able to determine the
probability of a defective fine tuner. But other buyers, particularly
73 When buyers cannot value the costs which particular contract clauses impose on them,
they cannot make rational decisions as to whether a contract with or without such clauses
more nearly corresponds with their wants respecting purchases, nor can they decide how
much to offer sellers to delete certain terms or insert others. For further explanation of the
undesirability of allowing bargaining in these circumstances, see Schwartz, Optimality and
the Cutoff of Defenses Against Financers of Consumer Sales, 15 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev.
499 (1974); Schwartz, The Private Law Treatment of Defective Products in Sales Situations,
49 Ind. L.J. 8, 17-28 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Schwartz]. Any imbalance of economic power
between sellers and buyers, except as the result of differential access to information, should
probably be irrelevant to the decision whether to permit or prohibit contracting out. See
Schwartz, Seller Unequal Bargaining Power and the Judicial Process, 49 Ind. L.J. 367 (1974).
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consumer buyers, will lack the technical facilities or expertise to
make such a determination and, for reasons elsewhere developed,
the market will be unlikely to inform them. 74 When that occurs,
clauses requiring acceptance with an accompanying price reduction
should be prohibited, unless the probability of defects is also dis-
closed; for without such disclosure bargains will be irrational be-
cause uninformed buyers will be unable to compare the price reduc-
tion with the risk they must bear. Finally, when sellers can ascertain
repair cost more cheaply than buyers, this element of C 1 should also
be disclosed.
Similar objections exist to contracting out by providing for
substantial performance or requiring buyers to accept cure. The
former offers buyers less information than a price discount clause,
since at best it enumerates possible defects without the seller's
estimate of their cost. A clause requiring buyers to accept cure
probably ensures that the seller will assume the costs of repair (C 1 ).
However, for the buyer to value the risk of incurring C2 and C3, he
must at least know the kinds of defects which are likely to arise and
the probability of their occurrence. The ordinary repair and re-
placement clause does not communicate this; and where buyers are
unlikely to ascertain this information on their own, contracting out
is again of questionable merit.
Several considerations, however, argue against prohibiting con-
tracting out unless information is disclosed. It will be difficult for
legislatures or courts to decide which classes of buyers are
sufficiently informed in a world where "sufficient" falls somewhere
between ignorance and omniscience. Also, the compiling and trans-
mitting of information is costly. Thus, in some cases the expense of
requiring disclosure will make contracting out an impractical alter-
native. Sellers, however, generally know the probability of defects
(p) and repair cost; thus, the major expense will be communica-
tion. 75
 In theory, the final decision should depend on comparisons
among: (1) the cost to sellers of providing information; (2) the cost to
buyers and society of bargains made partially in ignorance; and (3)
the cost to sellers of prohibiting contracting out. The costs which
each of these alternatives entail will probably never be precisely
Schwartz, supra note 73, at 13-15. See also R. Posner, Economic Analysis Of Law,
51-52 (1972).
75 Manufacturers must approximate the probability of defects and some aspects of defect
cost to operate quality control programs. See, e.g., R. Fetter, The Quality Control System
25-29 (1967); J. Juran & F. Gryna, Quality Planning And Analysis From Product Develop-
ment Through Usage 56-60, 135-41, 148-49, 176-80, 361-67, 559-62 (1970). Deciding pre-
cisely what information sellers should disclose and policing seller disclosures will not be
costless activities. At this stage, it is argued only that these costs do not seem so great as to
preclude the attempt. Should events teach otherwise, different solutions can be pursued.
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calculated but the choice can be approached with a broadly ac-
ceptable bias: society generally and sales law specifically are com-
mitted to bargains as the primary means of ordering transactions.
This implies a commitment to creating the conditions under which
bargaining may be rationally conducted. Society should, then, per-
mit bargains only when the parties thereto can be adequately in-
formed through their own efforts, unless the costs of this choice are
excessive. Since sellers already know the central cost elements which
must be disclosed—the probability of defects and the costs of repair
and replacement—the costs of conditioning contracting out upon
appropriate disclosure are unlikely to be great.
However, sellers avoid bad faith rejections by limiting the
ability of buyers to reject. Conditioning the seller's right to so limit
buyers on disclosure by the seller, in situations where buyers are
likely to be uninformed, will increase the expense of exercising this
right, and therefore raise a conflict between the policy of limiting
bad faith rejections and the policy of limiting irrational bargaining.
In practice, this conflict is less serious than it might appear. Bad
faith appears to be primarily a business phenomenon; rejections,
because of market decline or the later availability of a better deal,
and extortionate rejections of products which are hard to resell,
appear to be the behavior of professional buyers who possess the
expertise and self interest to so act. Information gaps, however,
occur primarily in markets where buyers are unsophisticated. Thus,
requiring disclosure only when buyers lack knowledge should not
significantly increase the risk of bad faith rejections.
In any event, the decision to repeal section 2-508 should not
turn on the solution to the contracting out problem. In the markets
in which buyers are informed, repeal of the section will improve
matters. When buyers lack information, repeal plus freedom of con-
tract will, at worst, work no change; for with the current statutory
right to cure, all buyers, in deciding whether to purchase, must now
value the costs of their sellers' right to cure. Furthermore, repeal
with limitations on the right to contract out may make bargains
more efficacious, probably without creating excessive costs.
B. Revocation
Sellers often attempt to limit their buyers' right to revoke accep-
tance by the use of such clauses as the standard repair and replace-
ment term, which bind buyers to accept cure by repair. If the
substantial impairment limitation is repealed, this practice should
increase. The same arguments made above with respect to contract-
ing out in a rejection context apply here as well. Moreover, the cases
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indicate that courts presently limit contracting out in situations
where buyers are unable to evaluate the costs of clauses eliminating
the right to revoke. 76 The standard judicial technique is to read a
term whose object is to have the buyer accept repair as a guarantee
that repair will be successful, so that, when it is not, buyers can
avoid the deal. In thus allowing revocation, one court explained:
After the purchase of an automobile, the same should be
put in good running condition; that is the seller does not
have an unlimited time for the performance of the obliga-
tion to replace and
tomobile is not bound
article indefinitely in
made to comply with
repair parts. The buyer of an au-
to permit the seller to tinker with the
the hope that it may ultimately be
the warranty. . . . At some point in  
time, if major problems continue to plague the automobile,
it must become obvious to all people that a particular
vehicle simply cannot be repaired or parts replaced so that
the same is made free of defect. . . . 77
While such judicial treatment may, in particular cases, be preferable
to allowing contractual avoidance of the perfect tender rule, it is
plainly not ideal. The need for a further statutory response is evi-
dent.
VI. CONCLUSION
Section 2-508's cure rule and the substantial impairment limita-
tion which section 2-608 imposes on the right to revoke acceptance
rest on erroneous assumptions as to how bargains respecting breach
work. One of these assumptions is that the parties cannot optimize
breach costs without the laid of the law. That assumption is erro-
neous, for bargains optimize breach costs unaided. The final two
assumptions as to how bargains respecting breach work are that
waste producing, bad faith rejections, and revocations occur with
sufficient frequency to cause concern and that sellers need the
Code's protection to avoid them. These also are mistaken: bad faith
occurs less frequently than is commonly supposed, because the costs
to buyers of acting in bad faith often exceed the gains which could
be derived from such action; and when that is not so, sellers gener-
ally protect themselves by contractually limiting the right of buyers
to reject. Bargains, in sum, will themselves achieve the goals
7e
	 Tiger Motor Co. v. McMurtry, 284 Ala, 283, 224 So. 2d 638 (1969); Jacobs v.
Metro Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 125 Ga. App. 462, 188 S.E.2d 250 (1972); Moore v. Howard
Pontiac-American, Inc., 492 S.W.2d 227 (Tenn. App. 1972).
Orange Motors, Inc. v. Dade County Dairies, Inc., 258 So. 2d 319, 320-21. (Fla. App.
1972) (citations omitted).
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toward which the cure and substantial impairment rules strive,
thereby making those rules superfluous. Unfortunately, these rules
are more than superfluous for they often operate to impose breach
costs unjustifiably on buyers, and sometimes to produce the
economic waste it is their purpose to avoid. Section 2-508 should
thus be repealed and the substantial impairment limitation deleted
from section 2-608. Matters will in some cases be made better, and
cannot be made worse, if no more is done than excise these two
sections from the Code.
Should these suggestions be adopted, many sellers will attempt
to avoid the perfect tender rule by contract. Bargains will be con-
cerned with what should be done in the event of breach, not what
should be done about a breach which has already occurred; that is,
the parties will bargain over risks, not incurred costs. Such bargain-
ing poses quite different legal issues. Risk costs cannot be optimized
unless the parties are sufficiently informed respecting them, but
many buyers will lack necessary information. The problems encoun-
tered with respect to bargaining about the risks of breach are but
one facet of a more general issue with which sales law has never
adequately coped—when should risk shifting by contract be permit-
ted or conditioned? It may be wiser to resolve the problem of
contractually avoiding the perfect tender rule as part of an overall
solution to the contractual risk shifting problem, since piecemeal
solutions may create additional difficuIties. 78 However, comprehen-
sive reform can take a very long time. Therefore, the Code should
be amended to permit sellers to avoid the perfect tender rule only
when their buyers can themselves value the costs imposed by this
form of risk shifting, or when sellers provide the requisite informa-
tion to buyers who now lack it.
76
 One difficulty would be the problem of coordinating disclosure requirements. Con-
sider, for example, a typical home solicitation sale of a stereo on credit in a state which has
adopted the Code and the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC). The seller must already
"conspicuously" disclose: (1) the warranty disclaimer, Uniform Commercial Code § 2-316(2);
(2) the buyer's obligation to notify the (named) assignee of claims or defenses arising against
the seller within three months of the sale, UCCC § 2.404(1); (3) the buyer's right to cancel
within three days, FTC Rule, Cooling-Off Period for Door-to-Door Sales, 16 C.F.R. § 429.1,
at 521 at seq. (Stipp. 1974); (4) a description of the stereo, UCCC §§ 2.304(1), 2.306(2)(a); (5)
the cash price plus sales tax, UCCC § 2.306(2)(b); (6) the downpayment, UCCC § 2.306(2)(c);
(7) the difference between the cash price and downpayment, UCCC § 2.306(2)(c); (8) a
description of the insurance on the stereo together with the buyer's right to purchase other
insurance if he chooses, UCCC §§ 2.306(2)(h), 2.202(2)(a); (9) the amount financed, UCCC
2.306(2)(i); (10) the credit service charge, UCCC § 2.306(2)(j); (11) the annual percentage rate,
UCCC § 2,306(2)(k); (12) the number of payments, their amounts and due dates, UCCC §
2.306(2)(1); (13) the delinquency charge in the event of late payment, UCCC § 2.306(2)(m); (14)
a description of the security interest, UCCC § 2.306(2)(n), If sales contracts are to contain
many more "conspicuous" disclosures, buyers may only read fine print. Also, the total cost of
making disclosure under several statutes could be great, so that deciding at one time which'
disclosures must be made and setting priorities among them would be essential.
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